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Abstract
Who benefits from the evasion of value added taxes (VAT)? Using a reform that en-
forced VAT on previously non-compliant large retailers in Armenia, we estimate a one-
third passthrough of the tax burden on prices. This suggests that pre-enforcement
evasion rents were broadly shared with consumers through lower prices. Our theoretical
and empirical results explain this low passthrough rate by the supply-chain effects and
second-order compliance responses of firms to VAT enforcement. Our distributional
analysis shows that households at the bottom of the income distribution benefit more
from the rents of evasion.
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1 Introduction
In public economics, passthrough parameters are important for the theory of tax incidence and
distributional equity (Kotlikoff and Summers 1987). More generally, the economic analysis
and policy evaluation of how cost shocks affect prices is important across a number of fields
in economics, such as macroeconomics (Nakamura and Zerom 2010), trade (De Loecker,
Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik 2016), monetary economics (Cravino and Levchenko
2017, Dornbusch 1987), and labor economics (Harasztosi and Lindner 2019), among others.
Although it is well recognized that the evasion and avoidance of taxes are large and universal
phenomena (Slemrod 2019, Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002), the study of tax incidence in the
presence of tax evasion is still rare. The question we ask in this paper is: how are the rents
of value added tax (VAT) evasion shared among market participants?
Standard theories of tax incidence assume away any issues of tax enforcement. Empir-
ical estimates of VAT incidence also typically ignore distortions created by non-compliance
opportunities because the VAT is generally believed to be self-enforcing.1 Most previous work
estimates a full passthrough of indirect taxes on to consumers (see, e.g., Poterba (1996), or
Bird and Gendron (2007) for a review), and interprets this estimate in light of the standard
competitive model (Fullerton and Metcalf 2002) that supply and demand elasticities are
sufficient to determine the proportion of the tax borne by each agent. Some evidence even
estimates over-shifting of indirect taxes to prices (e.g., Besley and Rosen 1999, Kenkel 2005)
which is consistent with models of imperfect competition (Weyl and Fabinger 2013), but may
also arise due to general equilibrium effects in a perfectly competitive framework (Agrawal
and Hoyt 2019). However, with an average passthrough estimate of above unity (see our
quantitative literature summary in Table A2 and Figure A1 of the Appendix), rarely has pre-
1See De Paula and Scheinkman (2010), Naritomi (2019), Pomeranz (2015), Waseem (2020) for evidence
on the self-enforcing properties of VAT. Keen and Smith (2006) review the various mechanisms of VAT
non-compliance, and Waseem (2019) presents evidence on the extent of non-compliance.
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vious work estimated substantial under-shifting2 of VAT to flexible prices3 in non-monopoly
settings.4
In this paper we study the incidence of VAT both empirically and theoretically, and
show that the case of substantial under-shifting is a plausible result in contexts which include
significant evasion opportunities. This is an important result rather than an outlier case since it
is now increasingly being recognized that despite the self-enforcing properties of VAT, evasion
from the tax can be substantial (Waseem 2020).5
The standard incidence results may not hold with evasion opportunities for several rea-
sons. First, incidence will be mechanically lower than assumed if the effective tax burden is
much smaller than the nominal tax burden due to evasion. Second, evasion opportunities may
be different between the sides of the market paying the statuary tax, making the equilibrium
price and quantity to be dependent on who remits the tax. Third, as we discuss more in
detail below, evasion and enforcement may introduce other less obvious incentives for eco-
nomic agents and respective behavioral responses. Such potential responses have implications
for agents’ demand and supply curves more generally, and are thus relevant for equilibrium
incidence.
Our empirical strategy exploits a large enforcement episode in Armenia which brought
previously non-compliant segments of the economy into the VAT system. As in many devel-
oping countries, agriculture is exempt from VAT in Armenia (for a review of the treatment
of agriculture under VAT, see, Cnossen 2018). With the aim to prevent high inflation, the
government allowed large formal retailers who operate under VAT (but who cannot have VAT
input invoices on local agricultural products that they sell because of the exemption) to reg-
ister thousands of postbox firms falling just below the VAT exemption threshold (for evidence
2There is also a more general literature studying the passthrough of cost shocks to prices often finding
undershifting (Ganapati, Shapiro, and Walker 2020, Koujianou Goldberg and Hellerstein 2012).
3Conlon and Rao (2019) shows that price rigidity can explain both incomplete and excessive passthrough
estimates.
4See Edgeworth’s taxation paradox for the special case of a monopoly where a tax hike reduces prices
(Hotelling 1932).
5Self-enforcing properties of VAT break down, for example, when most countries exempt certain segments
of the economy from VAT, such as through exemption thresholds for small firms or exemptions for certain
industries like agriculture.
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of such bunching behavior, see Figure 1) and book the sales of local agricultural products
happening in these large retail stores on the accounts of the non-VAT firms that only existed
on paper.6 A new government policy started to enforce VAT on these large retailers, which
increased their statutory tax rate from a sales tax of 5% to a VAT (but due to no deduction
possibilities effectively a sales tax) of 20%. As we detail below, our identification strategy
benefits from the specifics of the fairly unique enforcement episode in Armenia, in particular
from the opportunity to exploit both between and within firm variation, but we believe that
our evidence is relevant for a much wider class of reforms which start to enforce the VAT.7
We use data on product and store level prices at 10-day frequencies, and a triple-difference
design in order to estimate the incidence of enforcing VAT on prices. The design compares
prices of agricultural goods produced by local farmers (treatment products) to that of other
agricultural goods (control products) between affected and unaffected stores before and after
the reform, and controls for good-by-time, good-by-store and store-by-time fixed effects. We
show that in this setting the average passthrough of taxes to consumers is only about a third
of the tax burden. This estimate is much smaller than previous empirical estimates of VAT
incidence (which we summarize in Table A2). We provide suggestive evidence that firm owners
did not fully bear the remaining two-thirds of the tax burden, but were able to shift some of
the burden to employees as well as to farmers.
We then build a very simple model of tax incidence with evasion opportunities in an
economy with dual-tax regimes. The model generates predictions that help rationalize our
baseline result of low passthrough with the more standard incidence result of high passthrough.
We present suggestive evidence that is in line with these predictions. First, VAT enforcement
induces supply chain effects incentivizing retailers to buy more from VAT rather than non-
VAT firms. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that immediately following the reform,
the number of new VAT firms as well as aggregate sales by VAT firms in agriculture increases
6We call this tax planning strategy of splitting firms tax evasion rather than tax avoidance because the
Armenian law on the VAT clearly states that splitting a firm into several firms which are engaged in the same
activity with the intention to avoid the VAT threshold is illegal.
7For example, because of previous non-compliance of a firm due to the failure to register, or because of
the extension of VAT to new firms due to the inclusion of new sectors into the VAT system and due to other
tightenings of VAT exemption rules.
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sharply compared to turnover taxpayers. These supply chain effects change the cost structure
of firms and are relevant for equilibrium prices incidence. Second, we use data on thousands
of mystery shopper and food security audits, and find that switching the tax scheme from
turnover to VAT induces firms to become non-compliant with state regulations (in the form of
not printing receipts for tax evasion purposes as well reducing standards of product quality),
thus lowering their costs and the respective rate of passthrough. Additionally, we study how
the well known result of Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009), Finkelstein (2009), Taubinsky and
Rees-Jones (2018) that incidence depends on salience applies to our case where salience is
about the presence of tax evasion rather than the presence of a tax. We hypothesize that
salient information about the evasion behavior of firms generates consumer boycott towards
firms who are susceptible to evasion. We show that this demand response changes the price-
setting behavior of evading firms, and, similar to the other two mechanisms, results in lower
equilibrium passthrough.
In the final part of the paper, we use diary reports from household expenditure surveys to
show that while the demand of affected goods by average households was relatively inelastic
to changes in price, the incidence of the enforcement episode was distributionally not neutral.
In particular, we identify that the price changes mainly affected households at the bottom of
the income distribution. We derive income-group-specific behavioral changes in consumption
due to positive price elasticity of demand and cross elasticity of demand. We show that the
tax incidence implied a negative transfer of about 0.33% of total expenditures for households
at the bottom quintile of the income distribution, while the transfer was close to zero for those
at the top quintile. The size of these transfers relative to total expenditures are on average
small, owing to the fact that, unlike cases with general VAT changes, in our case expenditures
affected by the enforcement reform make a relatively small fraction of total expenditures
ranging from 5.5% to 3% along the income quintiles, but the distributional consequences
are clear. This analysis is related to the work by Bachas, Gadenne, and Jensen (2019) and
Nyg˚ard, Slemrod, and Thoresen (2019) who show that the de-facto progressivity of taxes can
be very different when evasion opportunities are taken into account.
4
Our paper is most directly related to the literature that studies the incidence of taxes in
contexts where agents have access to evasion or avoidance opportunities. In general there is
still very little such evidence. Alm and Sennoga (2010) analyze incidence and evasion in a CGE
model and show that with free entry, benefits of evasion do not stay with the evader. Kopczuk,
Marion, Muehlegger, and Slemrod (2016) study the passthrough of diesel taxes to retail prices
in US states which have different rules as to which seller in the supply chain remits the tax.
They reject the null hypothesis of the standard model, and show instead that the passthrough
rate is substantially higher when suppliers rather than the retailers, who probably have much
higher evasion opportunities, are responsible to remit the tax. Doerrenberg and Duncan
(2019) conduct a lab experiment and find that sellers with access to evasion opportunities
shift a smaller share of the nominal tax rate onto buyers. Wilking (2016) and Bibler, Teltser,
and Tremblay (2018) estimate incidence exploiting Airbnb’s tax enforcement agreements with
US cities, and Bibler et al. (2018) additionally use this incidence parameter to derive a lower
bound estimate of evasion. Dyreng, Jacob, Jiang, and Mueller (2019) study corporate tax
avoidance, and show that the rate of incidence of corporate taxes on labor is a substitute for
tax avoidance.
More generally, this paper is related to a large body of evidence that quantifies the
economic incidence of taxes. The following papers, among many others, study the incidence
of personal income (Kubik 2004, Ruf and Schmider 2015), payroll (Bozio, Breda, and
Grenet 2018, Saez, Matsaganis, and Tsakloglou 2012), corporate income (Fuest, Peichl, and
Siegloch 2018) taxes and that of benefits (Rothstein 2010). A bulk of evidence exists on the
passthrough of consumption taxes such as VAT (Benedek, Mooij, Keen, and Wingender 2016,
Carbonnier 2007, Kosonen 2015), sales taxes (Besley and Rosen 1999, Poterba 1996), and
excice taxes on gasoline (Bajo-Buenestado and Borrella-Mas 2019, Doyle and Samphantharak
2008), alcohol (Carbonnier 2013, Kenkel 2005, Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz 2002), tobacco
(Barnett, Keeler, and Hu 1995, DeCicca, Kenkel, and Liu 2013, Harding, Leibtag, and
Lovenheim 2012), or sugar (Bonnet and Requillart 2013), as well as subsidies (Hastings
and Washington 2010, Kirwan 2009, Pless and van Benthem 2019) on consumers through
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prices. Additional findings show that incidence depends on salience (Chetty et al. 2009,
Finkelstein 2009, Taubinsky and Rees-Jones 2018), can be asymmetric when considering
tax increases and decreases (Benzarti, Carloni, Harju, and Kosonen 2019), varies with firms’
pricing strategies (Harju and Skans 2018), can be different over time (Benedek et al. 2016,
Buettner and Madzharova 2019), has distributional effects (Gaarder 2018), and can be
shared more broadly with workers, firm owners, and suppliers of goods (Benzarti and Carloni
2019), among other findings.8 Slemrod (2008) reviews this literature qualitatively, while in
Table A2 and Figure A1 we quantitatively summarize the findings of this body of evidence on
consumption tax incidence. Our summary shows that the mean (median) passthrough rate
among the 67 baseline estimates collected from these 27 papers is 108% (92%), and, thus,
far above our estimate of a one-third passthrough.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the relevant
features of the Armenian tax system in general, and the reform that we exploit in particular.
Section 3 presents the data and our empirical design. Section 4 describes our main empirical
results on the passthrough of prices. Section 5 presents the model, and Section 6 shows the
additional evidence supporting the predictions of the model. Section 7 estimates the demand
responses of the average household, and presents calculations of relative transfers which the
reform generates for households along the income distribution. Section 8 concludes.
2 Setting
2.1 The enforcement episode
We use a sudden enforcement of the VAT regime on previously non-compliant retailers as
a “natural experiment”. At the end of May 2018 the government said it discovered 461
“postbox” firms falling just below the VAT registration threshold. Figure 1 shows strong
8A related strand studies how consumption responds to taxes (see, e.g., Baker, Johnson, and Kueng 2018,
Cashin and Unayama 2016). In this literature behavioral change is typically achieved through the price channel
only. Rees-Jones and Rozema (2019) presents evidence on different mechanisms of how demand responds to
tax changes other than through prices.
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evidence of this type of bunching of firms below the threshold.9 These postbox firms had a
total turnover of around $83 million, and although they were legally independent, in practice
they were being operated by the largest retailer in Armenia. This retailer used to channel its
sales of local agricultural products through these small firms. Since small agricultural holdings
are exempt from paying VAT (and other taxes) in Armenia, the local agricultural products
bought from these non-VAT sellers did not have VAT input invoices. Using these “postbox”
firms, the retailer paid turnover-based taxes of 5% on the gross sales of these small firms
rather than a VAT of 20%.10 The government closed the small firms and started to fully
enforce the VAT on the largest retailer. It also became apparent that the scheme was being
used by ten other large retailers in Armenia.
This episode affected locally produced meat and vegetable products. In our analysis we
focus on meat products. The reason is that the price and quality of vegetable are subject to
large fluctuations due to seasonal factors that are especially significant in the end of spring and
the beginning of summer, which is the period when the policy change we study happened.11
In contrast, seasonal fluctuations are much more modest for meat products and the market
structure is more clear, allowing us to distinguish between products that are supplied by small
farmers (non-VAT) from the ones supplied by large, legally registered entities (VAT firms).12
To make it clear, in the data, we do not directly observe the VAT status of a particular good
9The VAT registration threshold is unusually large in Armenia, summing to around $125 thousand of
annual turnover in 2018 and increasing to about $250 thousand of annual turnover in 2019 (Asatryan and
Peichl 2017).
10More specifically, sales of some agricultural goods were booked as if there is a virtual small firm which op-
erates independently inside a large store. Consumers could not detect this arrangement. After the enforcement
episode the physical organization of stores and goods inside them did not change.
11During this period, many vegetable products which grow in fields yield and replace the ones that were
grown in greenhouses or imported. Clearly, costs and prices for the same product are different depending
on the growing method and origin. In the case of imported vegetables, input VAT can be also rebated.
Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to clearly identify the origins and growing methods for all vegetable
products in all stores.
12According to the World Development Indicators, a substantial share of population of Armenia, about 34%
of total employment, is employed in agricultural sector and the vast majority of those are small farmers. The
fact that small agricultural holdings are exempt from VAT and other taxes indicates that living conditions
for people in this sector are rather low and the state maintains the policy to improve the livelihoods of
farmers and alleviate poverty. There is significant heterogeneity in the types of agricultural activities and their
organization because of agro-climatic conditions, which vary significantly across regions. In some activities
there is a substantial presence of large farms that employ modern agricultural techniques, while large farms
are essentially absent in others.
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Figure 1: Frequency of Firms around the VAT Registration Threshold
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Notes : The figure plots the frequency of VAT and turnover taxpayer firms
around the VAT registration threshold of 58,350 million AMD in income bins
of 1 million AMD (equivalent to about $2000).
sold in a particular store; however, the way markets operate in Armenia and their structure
allow us to make this distinction. We present the description of the market structure below.
2.2 Market structure
Table 1 provides information on the stock of animals in Armenia by the legal status of holdings.
The first two columns of Table 1 show that only a negligible share of cattle and pork stocks
is owned by holdings which have legal status. We thus conclude that nearly all of cattle and
pork production in Armenia escapes the VAT. The picture is different for poultry and farmed
fish. In these categories, holdings with legal status own a significant share of poultry or basins
where fish grows. The productivity in the fish farming sector is especially high, which is also
reflected in the fact that farmed fish is one of the main agricultural exports from Armenia.
The situation in beef and pork markets is the opposite, where exports are essentially
absent and the country imports rather large quantities of meat. Table 2 presents total annual
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Table 1: Stocks of Animal Husbandry by the Legal Status of Holdings
Treated Control
Cattle Pig Poultry Fish
Holdings w/o legal status 757,612 160,923 2,730,686 1,039,423
Holdings w/ legal status 6,605 9,723 2,518,680 324,481
Notes : For cattle, pigs and poultry figures show heads/numbers, for fish figures show basins (m2).
Source : ArmStat Agricultural Census 2014.
Table 2: Annual Imports of Meat by Categories
All Belarus
HS4 2017 2018 2017 2018
Meat of bovine animals; fresh 201 110.70 1,805.3 52.5 1,684.7
Meat of bovine animals; frozen 202 8,110.50 12,737.1 2.1 10.4
Meat of swine; fresh or frozen 203 16,045.50 15,358.6 14.6 1.6
Meat and edible offal of poultry 207 41,372.90 31,549 422.1 419.2
Notes : Figures are in thousand US dollars.
Source : Customs Service of the Republic of Armenia.
imports of different categories of meat at the 4-digit Harmonized System (HS) of product
classification for 2017 and 2018. An important observation that can be documented from
this table is that at the HS 4 level, it is possible to distinguish fresh bovine animal meat from
frozen. In 2017, before the policy change, the quantities of imported meat are very small
compared with frozen type. One reason is that Armenian consumers have strong preference
for fresh local meat, while imported frozen meat is predominantly used in the production of
processed meat products. The picture is similar for swine. At the HS 4 level, it is not possible
to distinguish frozen meat from fresh for swine meat; however looking at the HS 6 level reveals
the same patterns as for bovine animals.13 In the case of poultry, Armenia imports both fresh
and frozen products. At the same time, significant numbers of local poultry are owned by
firms with legal status.
Although holdings with legal status own almost half of the stock of poultry, one may
still have concerns regarding the share of poultry produced by small farmers and sold to
13Trade data at HS 6 level are available from UN Comtrade. However, we prefer to use the data provided
by the Customs Service of the Republic of Armenia because after Armenia joined the Eurasian Economic
Union, its trade with other members of the customs union is not reflected correctly in UN Comtrade.
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Table 3: Share of Annual Sales to Stock of Animal Husbandry
Cattle Pig Poultry
Share of sales relative to stock % 11.72 32.66 1.51
Notes : The table displays the share of annual sales in units relative to total holdings
in percentages among small farmers.
Source : World Bank, Integrated Living Conditions Survey 2018.
consumers. We can confidently claim that Armenian retailers do not sell domestically produced
poultry by small farmers. This becomes evident from Table 3 where we use the World Bank’s
Integrated Living Conditions Survey to construct sales to stock ratios for different categories
of animal husbandry. This is a household-level survey which provides information on earnings,
wealth, consumption, production and other activities of rural and urban households. Using this
survey, we construct information on the total number of animal husbandry owned in different
categories and total number/units of slaughtered and sold in respective categories within a
year (2018). From Table 3 we can see that sales of pigs account for the third of the stock.
In the case of cattle, the number is smaller at around 12% of the stock. This difference is
not surprising because cows are also used for purposes of milk production and the number
of slaughtered animals should be much lower compared with the stock. The same applies
to poultry, which can be used to produce eggs. However, that cannot justify the negligible
share of sales presented in Table 3. From this Table, it is evident that farmers do not sell
poultry but rather hold them for the production of eggs, and possibly for family consumption.
Unfortunately, the Integrated Living Conditions Survey does not provide data on fish but in
addition to the argument provided above, it is quite intuitive that in the presence of large
stocks of poultry and fish in holdings with legal status, VAT-paying retailers do not have
incentive to buy from small farmers. Furthermore, we conduct estimations by excluding fish
from our sample to ensure the robustness of our results.
Taking into account these observations, it is straightforward to classify products according
to whether they are supplied by small farmers or by large firms. Fresh beef and pork are supplied
by small farmers which do not pay VAT. Fish and poultry products are supplied by large firms
whether they are produced locally or imported. Finally, processed meat products are also
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supplied by large food processing firms. For the latter category we also observe the brands
of the producers. Additionally, we have interviewed managers of retailers and our interviews
confirmed our product classification approach regarding the VAT status of suppliers.
2.3 The reaction of retailers
After the policy change took place, the retailers took actions to restore previous arrangements.
They wrote an open letter to the prime minister, pointing at the negative consequences of
the policy change.14 In the letter they argued that the policy change can lead to substantial
increases in imported agricultural products at the expense of local farmers and, thus, to the
destruction of local jobs. Furthermore, the retailers jointly increased their prices by 20%
immediately after the policy change and tried to blame the government. Figure A2 in the
Appendix displays a photo taken in the largest retailer during the episode which says in
Armenian that the store had to start paying a 20% VAT.15 This, however, lasted for a few
days and eventually the retailers had to adapt to the new environment and resort to pricing
strategies dictated by market conditions.
3 Data and design
3.1 Data on prices
Retail price data comes from the Central Bank of Armenia. This is a confidential raw dataset
used to calculate CPI statistics for internal use and conduct checks on the CPI statistics
reported by the Statistical Committee of the Republic of Armenia. The data are available at
the level of detailed retail products (e.g., 25 distinct meat products) from around 40 large,
medium and small retailers operating in the 8 largest cities of Armenia on a 10-day frequency
from March 2017 to December 2018. Among those stores four are in our treated group. Stores
14“Supermarkets appeal to the prime minister: The stability of food prices is under threat” Yerkir Media,
June 1st 2018.
15It is likely that the objective of this behavior was to trigger a social unrest against the government’s
actions. One argument speaking for this hypothesis is that the firms increased prices by 20%, that is the
equivalent of the VAT ratem, to make the reform more salient, while in the case of complete passthrough
prices would have increased by 15% (the difference between the VAT rate and turnover rate).
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in the treatment group are larger than others and are typically represented by a number of
outlets in various districts of Yerevan and apply uniform pricing in all locations.
As discussed in Section 2 we restrict our sample to meat products. Fresh beef and pork
products are in our treatment group because they are nearly always supplied by small farmers
and are almost never imported. Based on these two features, we can confidently assume that
fresh beef and pork used to be sourced from non-VAT suppliers before the reform. We observe
prices for two categories of fresh beef and one category of pork. Within each category there
are three or four sub-categories of products. However the availability of these sub-products
varies from store to store. Remaining meat-related products in our sample, such as poultry,
fish, and all varieties of sausages are in the control group.16
Some products have sub-categories and others are available only at this more general
product level. For example, fish is available at the product level because there is only one
widespread variety. On the other hand, sausages are available at detailed level of sub-categories
where the information includes a brand name and a specific type of a sausage. In the case of
products supplied directly by farmers, obviously the brand name is not present, but there is
information on a particular part of the body. For example, for beef, it can be chuck, rib, etc.
3.2 Empirical specification
Our identification is based on a triple-difference design. We compare prices of agricultural
goods produced by local farmers (not VAT liable before the reform) to the control group of
other agricultural goods (VAT liable both before and after the reform) between large and small
retailers (havings turnovers that are, respectively, larger and smaller than the VAT exemption
threshold), before and after the sudden enforcement decision of June 1st, 2018.
We estimate a distributed lag triple difference-in-difference model:
log(pi,s,t/pi,s,t0) =
τ=k∑
τ=−k
ατ1[t = τ ] ∗ V ATi ∗ Larges + γi,t + λi,s + ηs,t + i,s,t, (1)
16Sausages are made from pork and beef but in Armenia producers use imported frozen meat as an input
for the production of such goods. See also large volumes of imports of frozen meat in Table 2. Furthermore,
even if they were to use domestic meat, sausage producers are large processing plants which operate under
VAT. Thus, the policy change would not directly affect these producers and the prices of their products.
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where pi,s,t is the price of good i, in store s, at time t. prices are relative to the pre-reform base
period. 1[.] is an indicator function of time periods, V ATi is dummy for goods sourced directly
from farmers, and Larges is a dummy for large retailers affected by the reform. γi,t, λi,s and
ηs,t are good-by-time, good-by-store and store-by-time fixed effects respectively. The inclusion
of good-by-time effects allows us to control for all changes in prices due to production costs
and aggregate demand changes that affect the entire country. Good-by-store effects allow us
to control for permanent differences in markups and pricing strategies used by different stores
for different goods. Finally, store-by-time effects allow us to make sure that we do not capture
some other shocks that affect specific stores. For example, one may argue that the overall
tax enforcement was tightened at large stores. i,s,t is the error term clustered at store and
time level.17
The affected stores are all located in the capital city, and since they account for a
substantial share of the retail market (Section 3.4 provides information on market shares),
one cannot rule out the possibility that unaffected stores also respond to the policy change.
In other words, we may observe some spillovers to those stores. If that is the case, then
Equation 1 will potentially underestimate the effect of the policy change on prices.18 For
this reason, in the following we introduce an additional term into Equation 1 to capture price
spillovers in the capital city:
log(pi,s,t/pi,s,t0) =
τ=k∑
τ=−k
ατ1[t = τ ] ∗ V ATi ∗ Larges+
τ=k∑
τ=−k
βτ1[t = τ ] ∗ V ATi ∗ Capitals + γi,t + λi,s + ηs,t + i,s,t.
(2)
where the additional term Capitals is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the
store is not affected by the policy change but is located in the capital city. By interacting this
17Benzarti et al. (2019) cluster errors at time level. Compared with their analysis we have an additional
dimension reflected by stores, so we add this additional level of clustering. Our results change very little when
we cluster errors at store-by-time level.
18See Agrawal and Hoyt (2019) for a theoretical treatment and empirical analysis of general equilibrium tax
incidence with spillover effects. Our case is different from the standard case in that in addition to the variation
among goods we can exploit variation among affected and unaffected stores for identification. Additionally,
the segmentation of the market in Yerevan versus the rest of the country allows us to directly estimate the
spillover effects.
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term with affected goods we will be able to capture potential spillover in the capital city by βτ
coefficients. It should be emphasized that Armenia is a small country and traveling distances
are not large, which is why retailers source their inputs from all regions. This implies that
input costs faced by all stores in all locations move together and potential asymmetric price
movements in the capital city are likely to capture price spillovers due to the market structure
rather than changes in input prices of suppliers in areas closer to the capital city.
3.3 Average effects
In addition to the distributed lag model, we also estimate the following standard triple
difference-in-difference model to obtain the average effect of the policy change:
log(pi,s,t/pi,s,t0) = α∗Postt∗V ATi∗Larges+β∗Postt∗V ATi∗Capitals+γi,t+λi,s+ηs,t+i,s,t,
(3)
where Postt is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 in all periods after the policy
change and 0 otherwise.
3.4 Additional evidence from household expenditure surveys
To complement our analysis we use household expenditure survey data, which contain infor-
mation on daily expenditure diaries of households. Using these diaries, we can study unit
prices as before, but, importantly for our purposes, extend the analysis to quantities.
We obtain data from the World Bank’s Integrated Living Conditions Survey for Armenia
for years 2016-2018. This survey is conducted annually for about six thousand households.
The dataset contains geographic information which we use to identify purchases made in the
capital city where the affected stores are located. Furthermore, there is information about the
type of the seller from which the purchase was made, such as stores, markets, street vendors,
etc. Unfortunately this information does not allow us to identify the large stores treated under
the reform that we exploit since the category “stores” also includes many small stores that
were not affected by the policy change. Instead, we proxy the treatment status of stores
14
by the geographic location of stores, in particular by assuming that all purchases made from
stores in the capital region are made at the large treated retailers.
This assumption is not very restrcitive, since according to Melkumyan (2014), a report
that studies the competition in the food retail market in Yerevan, large retailers account for
60% of the volume of purchases made in stores. Another report by Ameria Management Ad-
visory (2016) suggests a 50% market share for supermarkets in the market for meat products.
Both of these analyses are for the year 2014, and unfortunately we do not have more recent
data on market shares. However, both reports suggest that supermarkets were on a strong
upward trends in their market shares, and we believe that the shares in 2018 have increased
significantly from the 60% level. Our calculations based on data from Integrated Living Con-
ditions Survey for Armenia show that purchases from markets and streets accounts for only
6% of meat purchases. In the absence of information on exact store size, we think that it
is likely that our analysis of the survey data will underestimate the passthrough coefficient
because up to a third of the purchases are probably made in stores that were not directly
affected by the policy change.
Regarding the treatment status of products, these Living Conditions Surveys contain
detailed description of products, which we use to construct the sample of treated and control
meat products. As in the specifications with store-level price data, fresh beef and pork are
in the treatment group, while poultry, frozen and processed meat products are in the control
group.19 In the survey we do not observe the brands of processed meat products but there
are more categories of products than in the store-level dataset.
We estimate the following equation:
log(pi,r,t,j) = α ∗ Postt ∗ V ATi ∗ Capitalr + αXi,r,t,j + γi,t + λi,s + ηr,t + i,r,t,j, (4)
where we use the same notation that was introduced earlier. The only differences are that
instead of store, we index purchases by their geographic location (r) and we add a j subscript to
19The survey also provides information on fresh lamb purchases which we include in the treatment group
because according to the 2014 Agricultural Census, small farmers own the entire stock. It should be noted
that there are very few transactions in this category and the results are almost indistinguishable when lamb
is omitted.
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index transactions. The specification includes product-by-time, region-by-product and region-
by-time fixed effects. We cannot include household fixed effects because households are
generally surveyed within a month, and it is not possible to find transactions conducted by
a given household before and after the policy implementation. However, we can include
household characteristics such as aggregate household expenditures, household head’s age,
gender, level of education, number of household members, a dummy for rural households and
place of purchase.
4 Main results
4.1 Raw data
Before presenting the results of formal estimations, in Figure 2 we show the dynamics of
raw price levels by time in the four groups of stores and goods where our variation comes
from. These groups are: affected goods in affected stores, unaffected goods in affected stores,
affected goods in unaffected stores, and unaffected goods in unaffected stores. Price levels
are normalized to one in the initial period.
Figure 2 visually hints to the observation that parallel trends assumption is satisfied. We
notice that immediately after the policy change there is a large jump in the prices of affected
goods in affected stores, however, they decline to around their initial levels in the following
period. The massive price hike in the initial period is consistent with the anecdotal evidence
that large firms tried to trigger social unrest among consumers by increasing prices (see the
discussion in Section 2.3). In the consequent periods we observe that the price levels of
affected goods in affected stores are higher than in control groups but it is clear that there is
no complete passthrough.
4.2 Baseline results
The results from formal estimations of Equations 1 and 2 are plotted in Figures 3(a) and 3(b),
respectively, and the full estimation results are presented in Table A1 of the Appendix. First,
as we have seen in the raw data, these estimations show no evidence for trends in affected
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Figure 2: Development of Raw Price Levels
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Notes : This figure plots the levels of prices in different sets of stores and products. Abbrevi-
ation aff. and nonaff. mean affected and unaffected, respectively.
products and stores in the pre-reform period. The point estimates on the pre-trends are nearly
zero and are precisely estimated. At the reform period, denoted by 0 on the x-axis of Figure 3,
affected firms immediately increase the prices of affected goods by about 20% compared to
the level of prices in the pre-reform period. This price response is an overshifting of the tax
burden as compared to the hypothetical full passthrough rate implying a 14.29% increase
((1.2-1.05)/1.05=0.1429). This full passthrough rate is denoted by the red line in Figure 3.
As we discussed briefly above, it is likely that in the first period the objective of the
retailers was to pass a large price increase on consumers to possibly induce a social unrest
against the authorities and thus restore the privileges of the retailers. However, that did not
happen, and in the next period retailers brought prices back to about the level of pre-reform
prices. In the following periods, prices increase and stabilize roughly at a 5% higher level
compared to the pre-reform prices. This price effect implies a passthrough rate of about
one-third of the nominal tax increase.
17
Figure 3: Baseline Passthrough Estimates around the Reform
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(b) With spillovers
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Notes : These figures plot the estimated coefficients ατ for Equation 1 (Panel a) and
Equation 2 (Panel b). The coefficient ατ captures the interaction of affected goods in
affected stores after the policy change. Both specifications include good-by-time,
good-by-store and store-by-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at time and store
level.
When comparing Figures 3(a) and 3(b) we observe that the estimated coefficients are
somewhat higher and more precise for the specification that controls for spillovers. This is
intuitive because the affected firms account for rather large share of the market in Yerevan and
are likely to follow market leaders by increasing their prices despite the fact that the effective
tax rate they face did not change. We believe the specification that controls for spillovers is
more appropriate, and adopt it as our preferred specification in the analysis that follows.
4.3 Average effects
To obtain the average effect of the policy beyond its short-term effects we estimate Equa-
tion 3. As mentioned in Section 3 our data runs until early December which implies that our
estimations include 18 periods after the policy change. The results of the estimations are
presented in Table 4. The first column estimates a specification without the interaction term
for spillovers and the second one includes such a term. These two columns correspond to the
dynamic effects shown in, respectively, Figures 3(a) and 3(b). According to the specification
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Table 4: Baseline Passthrough Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
α 0.034 0.052* 0.046*
(0.030) (0.027) (0.024)
β 0.038 0.032
(0.028) (0.028)
Adj. R-squared 0.749 0.750 0.758
N 12682 12682 12201
Notes: OLS regressions of equations 3. The coefficient α captures the interaction
of affected goods in affected stores after the policy change. β captures the
interaction of affected goods in other stores in the capital region after the policy
change. All specifications include good-by-time, good-by-store and store-by-time
fixed effects. The specification in column 3 drops the observations below the 1st
percentile and above the 99th percentile and the first period after the reform.
Standard errors are clustered at time and store level. * (**) (***) indicates
significance at the 10 (5) (1) percent level.
in the second column of Table 4, the average increase in prices is about 5.2%. This estimate
corresponds to a passthrough rate of about 36% which is close to the estimate obtained from
equation 2 for short-run effects. We also can see that the spillover coefficient is positive but
statistically insignificant. In column (3) we test for robustness of our finding by dropping the
first period immediately after the policy change, where we observed a strong but temporary
hike in prices , as well as winsorize the sample. The estimated coefficient is only slightly
smaller and implies a passthrough of 32%.
5 Model
In this section we develop a simple theoretical framework in which firms operate either under
VAT or turnover tax schemes, and they endogenously decide their evasion levels. The optimal
level of tax evasion is related to the tax scheme because of the differential tax rate in the two
schemes. This simple stylized model helps us understand the mechanisms through which tax
evasion affects the passthrough levels of taxes on prices. The model implies testable prediction
on some of these mechanisms, which we then test empirically in Section 6.
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5.1 Setting
Firms operate in a two-tier system with either simplified turnover taxes or a standard VAT.
The tax scheme is defined by an exogenously given size threshold of x. Firms decide how
much to produce at price p which they take as given. All firms below the size threshold of x
face a turnover tax with a rate τ . Firms above the threshold operate under a VAT system with
a tax rate of t which is higher than τ . There are two inputs z1 and z2 with associated prices
P1 and P2. Firms operating under VAT input z1 can be credited against the VAT liability,
while firms in the turnover tax system have no such option. The motivation is that the first
input is produced by suppliers which themselves operate under the VAT scheme, while the
second input is supplied by non-VAT firms (small farmers). For simplicity, we assume that
the type of firm is determined exogenously. The second choice facing the firm is the evasion
decision denoted by fraction β of its sales. Tax authorities can detect evasion with probability
γ. When caught, the firm will face a penalty represented by a strictly positive and increasing
function h. For now we assume that only VAT firms can evade, later extending this possibility
to firms in the turnover scheme. As usual, we assume that the production function F is
positive, increasing, and concave in all of its arguments.
5.2 Firms
The profit function of the firm depends on the the tax scheme in which it operates and can
be written as:
pi =
 ((1− t)(1− β)p+ βp)F (z1, z2)− γh(β)− P1(1− t)z1 − P2z2 if F > x(1− τ)pF (z1, z2)− P1z1 − P2z2 if F < x
20
5.3 Optimal evasion
Taking the derivative of the profit function of VAT firms with respect to evasion rate of β we
obtain:
∂pi
∂β
= 0 =⇒ tpF (z1, z2) = γh′(β)
β = (h′)−1
(
tp
γ
F (z1, z2)
)
Thus we have that:
Reaction of evasion to tax rate
h′′ > 0⇒ ∂β
∂t
> 0 &
∂β
∂γ
< 0
If the penalty function h is convex then the evasion rate increases after an increase in the
tax rate and decreases after an increase in the probability of being caught.
5.4 Choice of suppliers
For notational simplicity, we denote (1− t)(1−β)p+βp as p(β, t). Turning to the derivative
of the profit function Fi with respect to the input i gives:
∂pi
∂z1
∣∣∣∣
F<x
= 0⇒ F1 = P1
p(1− τ)
∂pi
∂z1
∣∣∣∣
F>x
= 0⇒ F1 = P1(1− t)
p(β, t)
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How does the firm react in terms of input it demands when it turns from the turnover tax
scheme into VAT? First, we consider the simple case without any evasion, β = 0, and obtain:
F1|F>x & β=0 = P1
p
1− τ < 1
⇐⇒ p(1− τ) < p
⇐⇒ P1
p(1− τ) >
P1
p
⇐⇒ F1|F<x > F1|F>x & β=0
First prediction: Input demand reaction to VAT scheme
When a firm turns to the VAT tax scheme, the input demand toward the good already
on a VAT scheme increases.
We now allow some positive level of evasion, and study the range of values of β where the
first prediction holds. The ratio of both input demands is:
P1
p(1−τ)
P1(1−t)
p((1−t)(1−β)+β)
=
1
1− τ
(1− t)(1− β) + β
1− t
When is this ratio below 1? Recall that below 1 would mean that F1|F<x < F1|F>x.
1
1− τ
(1− t)(1− β) + β
1− t < 1
⇐⇒ (1− t)(1− β) + β < (1− τ)(1− t)
⇐⇒ β < −τ(1− t)
t
This last threshold is negative which means that it is never satisfied. Thus the first prediction
under β = 0 can be generalized to all values of β.
5.5 Tax scheme and evasion
Finally, we extend the possibility of evading to the firms operating under the turnover tax.
The evasion function is the same but with a different antecedent. As the only thing that
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distinguishes both types of firms is the output threshold, they sell at the same equilibrium
price since they sell the same good. We have:
t >τ and y|F>x > y|F<x
tpy|F>x
γ
>
τpy|F<x
γ
With the assumption that h′′ > 0:
(h′)−1
(
tpy|F>x
γ
)
> (h′)−1
(
τpy|F<x
γ
)
β|F>x > β|F<x
Second prediction: Change in evasion after tax scheme change
When a firm changes its tax scheme from turnover to VAT, the firm’s evasion rate
increases.
6 Extended results
Our model described in Section 5 generates two predictions that help rationalize our baseline
results of low passthrough in the presence of evasion possibilities with the more standard
empirical result of almost full passthrough. In sub-sections 6.1 and 6.2 of below we present
additional pieces of evidence which are consistent with these theoretical predictions. In par-
ticular, our empirical analysis characterizes the responses of demand for inputs to the VAT
scheme, and the response of non-compliance behavior to changes in the tax scheme. Addition-
ally, in sub-section 6.3 we descrbe how the well known mechanism of tax salience applies to
our specific case of tax evasion, and present suggestive evidence showing that the salience of
tax evasion leads to low passthrough of prices. In sub-section 6.4 we then extend the incidence
analysis beyond consumer versus firm dichotomy to cover producers as well as employees of
firms.
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Figure 4: Number of Taxpayers per Tax Type and Sub-sectors of Agriculture
(a) Number of Turnover Taxpayers
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(b) Number of VAT Taxpayers
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Notes : X-axis denotes quarters starting from 2016:q1 to 2019:q2. Vertical line denotes the
enforcement episode. Animal production represents the NACE sector A1.4, and Support
activities is NACE sector A1.6.
6.1 Supply chain effects
As predicted by our model, the VAT induces supply chain effects incentivizing retailers to buy
more from VAT rather than non-VAT firms. Gadenne, Nandi, and Rathelot (2018) and Gerard,
Naritomi, and Seibold (2018) provide evidence for this hypothesis using data on firm-to-firm
transactions in Brazil and India, respectively. We present two pieces of suggestive evidence
to complement these papers.
First, in Figure 4(b) we show that in the relevant sub-sectors of agriculture there are
increases in the number of locally registered VAT firms around the time of the reform. Fig-
ure 4(a) shows that, consistent with our interpretation of supply-chain effects, this evidence
holds only for VAT firms and not for firms operating in the turnover tax regime. Similarly, Fig-
ure 5 shows that (log) aggregate sales in the sector animal production and support activities20
increase for VAT but not for turnover taxpayers.
20These sectors are coded as A1.4 and A1.6, respectively, according to the NACE classification. For the
list of sectors and NACE codes, see https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/index/nace_
all.html.
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Figure 5: Aggregate Sales per Tax Type and Sub-sectors of Agriculture
(a) Animal Production (A1.4)
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(b) Support Activities (A1.6)
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Notes : X-axis denotes quarters starting from 2016:q1 to 2019:q2. Vertical line denotes the
enforcement episode. Y-axis is in logs. Animal production represents the NACE sector A1.4,
and Support activities is NACE sector A1.6.
Second, in our case of very limited number of local VAT suppliers (only several dozen
as shown in Figures 4(b)), at least a short run response of retailers is to shift to importing
products which are VAT liable at the border anyways. Table 2 presents total annual imports
separately for fresh and frozen bovine animal meat. This is an important distinction since the
reform primarily affected fresh local meat rather than frozen meat which, due to its longevity
properties, could have also been imported. Table 2 shows an order of magnitude increase in
the imports of fresh meat in 2018 compared to the pre-reform year of 2017. The increase is
almost fully driven by imports from Belarus, which is compatible with the anecdotal evidence
circulated in local media on the behavior of the large retailers.21
These two pieces of evidence are, of course, descriptive but they are consistent with the
interpretation that the enforcement of VAT incentivizes retailers to shift their supply chains
towards using inputs that are VAT liable. This evidence somewhat contrasts the findings of
Benzarti and Tazhitdinova (2019) who estimate the elasticity of trade with respect to VAT
to be very small. As before, this behavioral response of firms to VAT enforcement potentially
21“City is selling Belarusian meat...” Hayeli.am, February 14th 2019.
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changes the cost structure of the firms and thus results in lower equilibrium passthrough rate
than the rate predicted under the standard case without evasion.
6.2 Tax regime and evasion
In this sub-section we test the second prediction of our model that firms which switch from a
turnover based tax regime into a VAT regime are more likely to become non-compliant with
state regulations. In particular, we study non-compliance to tax regulations in the form of
not printing receipts as well as non-compliance to product quality standards in the form of
violating various food safety regulations.
To study tax compliance, we use data on thousands of mystery shopper audits. These
audits in our sample were performed during 2017 and the first half of 2018, and the data
is made publicly available by the State Revenue Committee of the Republic of Armenia.22
These audits are non-random and it is likely that they are more often targeting the VAT
firms, which typically face higher effective tax rates, than the small firms operating under a
turnover tax regime.23 Nevertheless, our analyis benefits from the fact that we include firm
level fixed effects and study the non-compliance behavior of firms that switched between the
two tax regimes during the period of six quarters of our sample. Of course, these switches
of the tax regime are not entirely orthogonal to the non-compliance or the audit decision
either. However, a legal change in 2018, which suggested that effective from January 2019,
the VAT registration threshold is reduced two-fold compared to its pre-reform level of around
$250 thousand of annual turnover, implies that at least some of the switching firms found
themselves to be in the VAT regime in 2018 independent of their will.
The results of this exercise presented in Table 5 show that, conditional on performing a
mystery shopper audit, VAT firms have about 15% higher likelihood of not printing a receipt
than firms paying a turnover tax (column 1). In monetary terms, this amount to an average
22See https://www.petekamutner.am/Content.aspx?itn=tsTILists; retrieved in Armenian on
17.05.2019.
23Doerr and Necker (2018) implement a field experiment where hypothetical consumers randomly ask
for receipts from small businesses. The paper finds evidence of collusive behavior where the willingness of
consumers to tolerate evasion by business translates into significant savings in the price consumers face.
26
Table 5: Mystery Shopper Audits in VAT and non-VAT Firms
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Penalty following an audit
Probability>0 Logarithm Thousand AMD
Switch to VAT 0.147* 0.917** 60.533**
(0.083) (0.435) (30.759)
Constant 0.879*** 4.525*** 212.260*
(0.086) (0.516) (109.720)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Time (Y-M-D) FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,460 10,218 10,460
R-squared 0.098 0.095 0.039
F 6.412 6.008 4.062
Number of firms 7,757 7,748 7,757
Notes : The unit of observation are mystery shopper audits. Dependent variables in
columns 1, 2 and 3 are, respectively, a dummy if a penalty follows an audit, the logarithm
of one plus the monetary value of penalty, and the monetary value of the penalty in
thousand AMD. The independent variable of interest “Switch to VAT” is a dummy for
firms switching from a turnover tax regime into a VAT regime. All regressions include
firm fixed effects. Even-numbered columns include fixed effects for the year, month and
day of conducting an audit. Standard errors are clustered at the level of firms. * (**)
(***) indicates significance at the 10 (5) (1) percent level.
fine of 60 thousand AMD (or about $150) in VAT compared to non-VAT firms (column 3).
This finding that compliance is decreasing with the VAT rate is generally consistent with
earlier empirical evidence (see, e.g., Artavanis 2018, Berger, Gerlinde Fellner-Rohling, and
Traxler 2016, De Paula and Scheinkman 2010) as well as the deterrence model of compliance
with endogenous audits (Allingham and Sandmo 1972, Gordon 1989, Yitzhaki 1977). This
finding is also similar to previous evidence where firms respond to enforcement by moving
to other perhaps less verifiable margins of non-compliance (Carrillo, Pomeranz, and Singhal
2017, Slemrod, Collins, Hoopes, Reck, and Sebastian 2017), including such evidence from
Armenia (Asatryan and Peichl 2017). Intuitively, higher non-compliance in the presence of a
higher tax rate depresses the effective tax rate, so that the passthrough rate becomes smaller.
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Table 6: Food Security Audits in VAT and non-VAT Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Probability (Penalty following an audit) >0
Cross-section Panel
VAT 0.0106*** 0.0159***
(0.0004) (0.0009)
Switch to VAT 0.3617*** 0.4505***
(0.1333) (0.1429)
Constant 0.0042*** 0.0829 0.6690*** 0.5242
(0.0001) (0.0983) (0.0752) (0.3231)
Firm FE Yes Yes
Time (Y-M-D) FE Yes
Industry FE Yes
Observations 415,847 170,806 1,995 1,768
R-squared 0.0014 0.0354 0.0222 0.2154
Number of firms 1,669 1,533
F 590.7 272.9 7.365 1.192
Notes : The unit of observation are firms in columns 1-2 and audits in columns 3-
4. The dependent variable is a dummy if a violation is found during an audit. The
independent variable of interest “VAT” is a dummy equalling 1 for firms in a VAT
regime and 0 for firms in a turnover tax regime, and “Switch to VAT” indicated the
switchers from 0 to 1 . Column 2 includes industry fixed effects at the level of NACE
letters. Columns 3-4 include firm fixed effects. Column 4 includes fixed effects for the
year, month and day of conducting an audit. In panel regressions standard errors are
clustered at the level of firms. * (**) (***) indicates significance at the 10 (5) (1)
percent level.
We then complement the main exercise with mystery shopper audits by studying the
question of whether firms respond to the reform by additionally reducing product quality. We
use data on about 2,000 food security audits conducted in the years 2012 to 2018. The data
is made publicly available by the Food Safety Inspection Body of the Republic of Armenia.24
Table 6 studies the probability that a food security violation is found after an audit. Columns
1 and 2 compare VAT and non-VAT firms in a cross-section, while columns 3 and 4 focus
on firms that switched between non-VAT and VAT regimes in a panel fashion. The latter
24See http://snund.am/en/inspection-plans/the-results-of-inspections/; retrieved in Arme-
nian on 29.04.2020. Data for the year 2016 is not available.
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Figure 6: Passthrough in Stores Subject to Consumer Boycott
(a) Only Boycotted Stores
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Notes : Sub-figure (a) and (b) replicates the baseline analysis of Figure 3 by restricting the
sample to, respectively, only the largest retail chain and the baseline sample including the
largest retail chain.
sample is much smaller since we are studying the sub-sample of switchers where audits were
conducted in both tax regimes, but these regression control for firm fixed effects. The results
from both samples are consistent with the interpretation that the reform induces firms to
decrease product quality standards. Similar to non-compliance with taxes, this second form
of non-compliance with state regulations more generally potentially depresses the costs that
firms face, thereby implying a lower passthrough rate.
6.3 Salience and consumer boycott
Chetty et al. (2009) predicts under-reaction of prices to taxes if the existence of the tax is
made more salient to the consumer. Unlike the US, posted prices in our case are final and
always include the tax. Nevertheless, the enforcement episode in Armenia may have made the
VAT more salient to the consumers in two ways. First, discussions of the enforcement episode
raised awareness that retail goods are in general taxable. Second, and more specifically, these
discussions made the evasion aspect of taxes salient, that is they made it clear that taxes are
being applied to the sub-set of stores which used to evade taxes.
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Our identification approach is immune to the first mechanism given the triple-difference
design. If salience of the VAT is increased for both treated and untreated products, we can
net out the potential effects of salience on prices by differencing the prices of treated and
untreated products within stores. To study the salience of the tax evasion aspect, we take
advantage of the fact that the government’s initial enforcement effort as well as the whole
publicity of the episode was narrowly targeted on one retail chain which happens to be the
largest retailer as well as a firm that is widely believed to be politically connected with the
previous government. Only after this initial publicity scandal it was revealed that other large
retailers used similar strategies. 25
To understand how the temporary surge in such sentiments affects the pricing behavior
of the firm, we estimate a specification similar to Equation 2 but our treatment group includes
only this specific large retailer.26 In Figure 6 (a) we plot the estimated coefficients ατ . The
results show that this firm, similar to other large ones, increased its prices in the first period
trying to trigger social unrest and then it decreased prices to its initial level. However, unlike
the other stores its prices of affected goods remained at the initial levels during the following
periods. It even decreased them in an effort to dump and attract consumers. Average
estimates that include further periods, similar to the ones presented in Table 4, yield very
small and insignificant effects. Figure 6 (b) then replicates the baseline analysis in the baseline
sample including the largest retailer and its smaller affiliate. As can be seen, the inclusion of
these retailers drives the estimates down compared with the ones in Figure 3(b).
This evidence is specific to the firm and we can not rule out alternative explanations of
the results. Nevertheless the evidence we present is suggestive of the salience mechanism.
Information about the evasion behavior of firms generates consumer boycott towards the
evading firm. This demand response forces the firm to revise its price-setting behavior trying
to attract more demand and leads to lower equilibrium passthough. This mechanism is related
to the findings of Antoniades, Clerides, and Xu (2019) who study an informational shock that
25“New discoveries of the National Security Service about Yerevan City retail chain” Banks.am, May 30th
2018.
26This organization also runs a separate smaller retail brand and our dataset contains information on prices
in both.
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induced a strong and religiously motivated boycott towards Danish products in the markets
of Saudi Arabia. Although the setting is very different, the negative response of prices to
boycott-driven demand shock that Antoniades et al. (2019) find is consistent with our results.
Fisman, Hamao, and Wang (2014), Michaels and Zhi (2010), Pandya and Venkatesan (2016)
present further evidence on the role of national sentiments in consumer demand and firm
pricing decisions.
6.4 Incidence on other sides of the market
So far we have studied the incidence of VAT on consumers through prices. We have estimated
the passthrough on prices to be about a third of the tax burden. The question we ask in this
section is whether the remaining two-thirds of the tax remained with the firm-owners or
whether it was shifted further onto producers or employees. In so doing we contibute to the
literature that aims to quantify tax incidence on all immediate market participants (Benzarti
and Carloni 2019). We find some suggestive evidence that both farmers and producers may
have borne some of the tax burden. However, given data and identification limitations, we
can not yet provide a sound conclusion nor quantify effects precisely. Indeed, as we discuss
below, these findings rely on assumptions in addition to those made in the baseline analysis.
6.4.1 Farmers
As described in Section 3.4 we can measure consumer prices from the household expenditure
survey. This survey also has a section surveying a small number of farmers and their production
activities. From here we can calculate producer prices, i.e., unit prices of animals slaughtered
by farmers and sold in the market, and compare these to the prices reported by consumers.
We plot the monthly evolution of these consumer and producer prices in 2018 in Figure 7.
In general, consumer prices are somehwat higher in the second half of 2018. Producer prices
seem to also follow this trend, although the time series is also noisy due to the small number
of transactions by farmers that we observe. This joint movement of producer and consumer
prices would go opposite to the hypothesis that retailers were able to shift some of the
remaining tax burden to farmers through lower prices. Of course, there are many aggregate
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Figure 7: Consumer and Producer Prices
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shocks potentially affecting both demand and supply, which can drive this joint movement in
prices. We therefore seek next to address the question of whether some of the tax incidence
fell on the farmers by exploiting regional variation in Armenia.
Armenia is a small country and all regions supply agricultural products to the capital,
which itself does not produce agricultural goods but is the largest consumer of such goods.
In addition to the capital city there are 10 other provinces. Due to the peculiar geography
of Armenia, one region, Syunik, is by far more isolated from the rest of the country and in
particular from the big markets of the capital, Yerevan. In this exercise, we exploit this specific
feature of Armenia’s geography and study the regional spillovers originating from Yerevan by
taking this isolated region as a control group.
According to Google Maps, it takes about two hours to drive from Yerevan to the capital
city of any of the regions.27 The only exception is the Syunik region, which is geographically
isolated. From Yerevan it takes about six hours by car to reach Syunik’s capital and largest
27Capital cities are generally located in population weighted centers of each region.
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city, Kapan, the car being the only mode of available transportation. Since most suppliers are
small farmers and deliveries are small, the fixed cost of making the round trip from Syunik to
Yerevan is very high.28 In the absence of large producers, firm fixed costs and time of travel
make a major obstacle for producers of perishable goods such as fresh meat. These features
make the region of Syunik a relatively clean control group.29
Ideally, we would like to compare how producer prices plotted in Figure 7 reported by
farmers in Syunik behaved as compared with other provinces. However, due to the small
number of transactions, we use consumer prices and re-estimate equation 4 by redefining
the treatment variable to be zero for Syunik and one for all other regions except Yerevan
(which we drop in this analysis). The results of the estimation presented in the last column of
Table 7 show that the prices of affected goods decreased in regions close to Yerevan, relative
to those in Syunik. This result provides suggestive support for the hypothesis that the VAT
enforcement and the respective contraction of demand in Yerevan (as shown in column 3
of Table 7) had a negative impact on the average prices of regions catering to Yerevan as
opposed to the control region of Synuik.
6.4.2 Employees
In this subsection we investigate the effect of the policy change on employment dynamics.
Ideally, we would like to use tax-return data of firms to study wages and firm profits. Unfor-
tunately, this is not possible since the confidentiality of such tax data does not allow us to
identify the treated retailers. However, in Armenia data on the number of workers employed by
each firm is made publicly available by the Insurance Foundation for Servicemen since 2017.30
We merge this data with further publicly available registry data on basic characteritics of
28It is worthwhile to note that in order to improve phytosanitary conditions, from the start of 2020 the
government introduced a requirement that all live animals should be slaughtered in slaughterhouses. This
requirement met a significant opposition from farmers. Despite the determination of the prime minister, the
government had to postpone the implementation of the regulation. This episode demonstrates that there are
many small farmers who slaughter their animals at farm and not in special facilities.
29In terms of population, Syunik is ranked 7th out of 10 provinces, and in terms of cattle heads, 5th.
Population data are from the most recent Census, conducted in 2011, and livestock data are from the 2018
Integrated Living Conditions Survey.
30See https://www.1000plus.am/en/search/mandatory/; retrieved in Armenian on 26.06.2019.
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Figure 8: Employment Dynamics in Affected and Unaffected Stores
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captures the interaction of affected stores after the policy change. Estimations include time
and store fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at time level.
firms (such as industry and location) as well as quarterly firm-level data on amounts of tax
payments for the one thousand largest taxpayers (which jointly pay almost 80% of taxes in
Armenia).31
We estimate how the employment of affected firms evolved after the policy change. Our
control group in this specification are other firms in the food retail sector. Thus we depart
from the triple-difference method used above and rely a difference-in-difference estimation.
More specifically, we estimate the following specification:
log(es,t/es,t0) =
τ=k∑
τ=−k
ατ1[t = τ ] ∗ Larges + λs + ηt + s,t, (5)
where es,t is the number of employees at store s, at time t relative to the base. 1[.] is an
indicator function, Larges is a dummy for large retailers affected by the reform. λs and ηt
are store and time fixed effects, respectively. s,t is the error term is clustered at the level of
firms and time.
31Both of these datasets are made available by the State Revenue Committee of the Republic of Armenia;
see https://www.petekamutner.am.
34
The results of estimations are presented in Figure 8 which plots the estimated coeffi-
cients ατ . The pre-trends are flat. After the reform, affected firms experienced a decline in
employment that peaks in month five at around a 15% decrease in the number of employees.
This result would point to the possibility that some of the tax burden was passed on to em-
ployees. However, we also note that this evidence remains suggestive due to our inability to
use the baseline triple-difference model. The evidence here depends on the assumption that
the treated set of large retailers were not affected differently in the post-reform period.
7 Consumer welfare
In this final section we use data from household expenditure surveys to study how the
enforcement-driven price increase is reflected in consumer purchases of an average house-
hold. We then decompose these average price and quantity effects for separate parts of the
income distribution, and calculate the relative transfers that the enforcement episode gen-
erated for households along the income distribution. The data and estimation strategy are
described in Section 3.4.
7.1 The price elasticity of demand
We start by testing whether the price increase in affected goods that we have identified so
far is reflected in consumer purchases as well. The results of estimating equation 4 on prices
are presented in the first column of Table 7. The treatment effect estimate confirms the
hypothesis that after the policy change there was a statistically significant differential increase
in price of affected goods in the capital. The magnitude of this price effect is more than two
times smaller than our baseline estimates of incidence obtained from store-level price data
(see Table 4).32 As we argued in Section 3.4, our estimates based on survey data, are likely to
underestimate the passthrough because we cannot identify affected stores, so we proxy them
based on their locations.
32However, the confidence intervals of the two estimates intercept. Additionally, in section 7.2 below, we
decompose the price incidence parameter into income quintile specific estimates and show that these estimates
obtained from household survey data are similar to the baseline estimates of incidence if we only consider the
incidence parameter of the affected households.
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Table 7: Consumer Responses in Price and Quantity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A Panel B
Log Price Log Quantity in kg Log Price
Beef/Pork Poultry Beef/Pork Poultry Beef/Pork
Treatment (α) 0.019*** 0.018 -0.014*** 0.023*** -0.028**
(0.006) (0.017) (0.000) (0.001) (0.010)
Expenditures 0.033*** 0.042*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.025***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Adj. R-squared 0.897 0.860 0.346 0.305 0.902
N 59517 41872 398377 286542 36309
Notes: OLS regressions of equation 4. Treatment (α) captures the interaction of affected
goods in the treatment region after the policy change. In Panel A the treatment region is
the capital city (Yerevan). In columns 1-2 the dependent variable is the transaction price
and in columns 3-4 the dependent variable is the the quantity of product consumed in kg.
In columns 1 and 3 the treatment products are fresh beef and pork. In columns 2 and 4
the treatment products is fresh poultry. In Panel B the control area is the isolated region
of Syunik, and the treatment area includes all other regions except for Yerevan (which
is excluded from this sample). In column 5 the dependent variable is the transaction
price and treatment category is fresh beef and pork. Estimations control for household
head’s age, gender, level of education, number of household members, a dummy for rural
households and place of purchase. Estimations also include good-by-time, good-by-region
and region-by-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at time and region level.
* (**) (***) indicates significance at the 10 (5) (1) percent level.
Then we study how expenditures on affected goods change given the tax-induced change
in prices. To this end we re-estimate equation 4 but as a dependent variable taking the
quantity of household purchases of a given good category measured in kilograms. To estimate
this specification, we aggregate purchases over transactions (subscript j in equation 4). This
estimation is presented in column 3 of Table 7. As expected, we observe a drop in expenditures,
given the price increase. The change in the expenditures of affected goods amounts to a 1.4%
drop in kg expenditures for the average household. Given the price change estimated in column
1 of Table 7, we arrive at an estimate of price elasticity of demand for meat of about 0.74.
Being below unity, this estimate suggests that meat consumption in Armenia is relatively
inelastic. This response is very similar to the standard findings of the literature and is in
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the range of an elasticity of 0.7-0.8 as found in the meta-analysis by Andreyeva, Long, and
Brownell (2010).
We also investigate price and quantity responses of the closest substitute food item. We
consider that the closest substitute product for fresh pork and beef is fresh poultry. Columns
2 and 5 of Table 7 reestimate our regressions for price and quantity, respectively, but our
treatment product category includes different types of fresh chicken products. The set of
the control products is the same as in previous regressions.33 We do not find evidence for
significant price effects on fresh poultry products; however, the quantities of purchased poultry
increase. This suggests that there was a substitution between the consumption of beef and
pork into chicken, with a cross elasticity of demand of around 1.64.34
7.2 Distributional effects
It is possible that the average treatment effects we have estimatesd for consumer prices and
consumption quantities are different across the income distribution. To study this hypothesis,
we interact the treatment effect of equation 4 with quintiles of aggregate annual household
consumption as a measure of income,35 and in Table 8 estimate the heterogenous treatment
effects on prices and quantities of beef and poultry as well as the substitute product of chicken
across the income distribution. This analysis shows that the passthrough of VAT enforcement
onto the price of beef and pork products is distributionally not neutral. Column 1 of Table 8
indicates that prices increase by 4 to 5% for households at the bottom three quintiles, by 2%
for households at the fourth quintiles, but they essentially do not change for households at
the top quintile of the distribution. This result is consistent with the findings of Atkin, Faber,
33Fresh beef and pork products are excluded from estimations.
34We also estimated specifications where our treatment group includes all meat related products (the
control group in columns 2 and 4 of Table 7) and the control group is all remaining food categories. Our
estimated coefficient turns out to be very small, indicating that the control group in our regressions is stable.
Furthermore, our result change very little if we reestimate all regression in table Table 7 and make all other
purchased food as our control group.
35We follow Bachas et al. (2019) and the references therein by approximating the income distribution with
aggregate household consumption rather than measures of income. One reason behind this approximation is
the conjecture that surveys often measure income poorly due to various reasons such as income underreporting
(Pissarides and Weber 1989).
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Table 8: Distributional Responses in Price and Quantity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Price Log Quantity in kg
Beef/Pork Poultry Beef/Pork Poultry
Q1 Treatment (α) 0.044*** 0.046* -0.039*** 0.012***
(0.011) (0.021) (0.001) (0.001)
Q2 Treatment (α) 0.039*** 0.037* -0.025*** 0.025***
(0.007) (0.019) (0.001) (0.001)
Q3 Treatment (α) 0.048*** 0.028 -0.017*** 0.012***
(0.008) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001)
Q4 Treatment (α) 0.021*** 0.026 -0.003 0.035***
(0.006) (0.017) (0.002) (0.002)
Q5 Treatment (α) -0.003 -0.006 -0.007*** 0.024***
(0.006) (0.019) (0.002) (0.001)
Expenditures 0.034*** 0.042*** 0.019*** 0.016***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001)
Adj. R-squared 0.897 0.861 0.347 0.307
N 59517 41872 398377 286553
Notes: OLS regressions of equation 4. Treatment (α) captures the interaction of
affected goods in the capital region after the policy change. Treatment is interacted
with dummies for quintiles of household total expenditure level. In columns 1-2 and the
dependent variable is the transaction price and in columns 3-4 the dependent variable is
the the quantity of product consumed in kg. In columns 1 and 3 the treatment products
are fresh beef and pork. In columns 2 and 4 the treatment products is fresh poultry.
Estimations control for household head’s age, gender, level of education, number of
household members, a dummy for rural households and place of purchase. Estimations
include good-by-time, good-by-region and region-by-time fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at time and region level. * (**) (***) indicates significance at the 10 (5)
(1) percent level.
Fally, and Gonzalez-Navarro (2020), Faber and Fally (2020) where prices are heterogenous
across the household income distribution.
We then approximate the orders of magnitude of the welfare implications of tax evasion
for consumers situated along the income distribution. Our very simple approach to measuring
welfare is to quantify the observed changes in consumption patterns resulting from the reform.
We empirically estimate the parameters characterizing the demand function rather than study-
ing optimized demand from utility maximization. In contrast, Gaarder (2018) and Mariscal
and Werner (2018) estimate a full demand system as proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer
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Figure 9: Size of Relative Transfers over Household Income Quintiles
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of demand for treated products and cross elasticity of demand for substitute products as
derived from estimates of Table 7.
(1980) and extended to a non-linear setting by Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1997). More
generally, Atkin et al. (2020), Atkin, Faber, and Gonzalez-Navarro (2018) estimate price and
welfare effects that vary by the income of households. Our analysis also assumes that the
potential government revenues resulting from tax enforcment do not flow back to consumers.
Using the passthrough estimates of column 1 of Table 8 and data on income and expen-
diture shares of quitiles, the first bars of Figure 9, labeled “Price effect”, present mechanical
calculations of relative size of transfers in relation to household aggregate consumption across
the quintiles of household income distribution. These transfers are only a first-order ap-
proximation of the distributional effects of tax evasion as they assume that the tax-induced
change in prices did not lead to any behavioral responses by households. Taking into account
the behavioral responses related to changes in consumption will mitigate or exacerbate the
distributional effects of tax evasion depending on whether the underlying parameters of con-
sumption responses are elastic or not. In particular, we study the behavioral change in the
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consumption of treated products as well as the potential responses in switching to the con-
sumption of substitute products, which describes the cross elasticity of demand. Consistent
with the result that prices have a higher incidence on households at the bottom half of the
income distribution, column 3 of Table 8 shows that behavioral changes in the consumption of
beef and pork are stronger among the poor compared to the richer households. To calculate
quintile-specific elasticites, we round the changes in prices and quantities to the second deci-
mal and estimate decreasing elasticities of 1, 0.75, 0.4, 0 and 0 for the quintiles going from
the poorest to the richest. The second bars of Figure 9 indicated with “Consumption effect”
use these elasticities and correct the quintile-specific size of relative transfers with the be-
havioral change in the consumption of treated products. Regarding the potential substitution
effects, we observe that the quintile-specific changes in the price of chicken shown in column
2 of Table 8 are similiar to those of beef and pork. Similiar to the elasticity of demand, we
calculate the cross elasticity of demand for chicken with respect to beef and pork. The last
bars of Figure 9 further correct transfers with this behavioral change in the consumption of
substitue products.
The dark-shaded bars labeled “Substitution effect” of Figure 9 indicate quintile-specific
transfers related to enforcing the VAT after taking into account these two types of behavioral
responses. Owing to the small share of the value of treated products in total expenditure, that
averages at around 3.4%, these transfers remain small. This simple calculation suggests that
transfers gradually decrease in size along the quintiles. It takes 0.33% of total expenditure for
households at the bottom quintile to pay for the tax, while the transfers from households at
the top quintile nearly equal zero.
Our finding that the enforcement of VAT is likely regressive is interesting in that, despite
the importance of this question, there are not many papers studying it empirically. Of course,
there is a large debate on whether the VAT is progressive or regressive. In developed countries
it is more often found that the VAT is regressive (Gaarder 2018). We contribute to this debate
by showing that the VAT may be more progressive than often thought when considering the
presence of evasion opportunities. This conclusion is similiar to the one by Bachas et al.
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(2019) who use household expenditure surveys from multiple developing countries and show
that consumption taxes are de-facto more progressive when evasion opportunities are taken
into account.36 These findings arise from the conjecture that evasion is concentrated among
small informal retailers where poorer households are likely to shop, while we show that the
result can also hold in large formal supermarkets operating in relatively developed urban areas.
Nyg˚ard et al. (2019) is the only other paper on the distributional implications of VAT evasion
that we are aware of. They study the question of how consumers and retailers benefit from
collusive evasion, and show that, in contrast to our result, in Norway the extent of inequality
becomes higher once adjusted for evasion. Estimates of retailers’ rents of tax evasion along
the income distribution are obtained using the expenditure method of Pissarides and Weber
(1989). To calculate the benefits of evasion for consumers, Nyg˚ard et al. (2019) as well as
Bachas et al. (2019) make assumptions about how prices in the hidden market deviate from
prices in the regular market. In contrast, we estimate this passthough parameter directly from
data.
This finding is also related to a more general, albeit still small, literature about the
distributional effects of evasion and avoidance of income and wealth taxes, and not only of
consumption taxes. Bishop, Formby, and Lambert (2000) and Johns and Slemrod (2010)
use data from random audits conducted by the Internal Revenue Service of the US to study
how the income distribution of individuals changes once correcting income for detected non-
compliance, while Alstadsæter, Johannesen, and Zucman (2019) estimate the evasion behavior
of the very wealthy in Scandinavian countries using data from random audits and offshore
leaks.
8 Conclusions
A large literature in economics studies the question of how value added tax (VAT) burden is
shared between the important groups of market participants as consumers, retailers, employees
36Jenkins, Jenkins, and Kuo (2006), Mun˜oz and Cho (2003) use similiar techniques and study, respectively,
the Dominican Republic and Ethiopia.
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and producers. Despite the importance of tax evasion and avoidance as a quantitatively
relevant phenomenon in many settings, rarely has previous research studied the incidence of
VAT, or taxes more generally, in environements where evasion opportunities prevail. This has
often led policy makers to assume that the rents of evasion from VAT typically remain with
the party who is statutorily responsible for remitting the VAT, that is the retailer, and design
policies in accordance to that belief.
Our study tries to understand the distributional consequences of VAT evasion both be-
tween and within groups of market participants applying a sharp identification approach. We
exploit an enforcement episode in Armenia that brought non-compliant but otherwise large
and formal retailers into the VAT system. We show that consumers bore only up to a third of
this tax burden through changes in prices, which suggests that the rents of pre-reform evasion
were broadly shared with the consumers.
We then ask whether these benefits of evasion were shared equally among consumers
with different levels of income. We use data on diary reports of daily expenditures from
household surveys and decompose the average incidence estimate into income quintile specific
parameters. By estimating income-specific price elasticity of demand for products affected
from the tax enforcement as well as the cross-elasticity of demand to substitute products, we
calculate that household responses to the enforcement reform tend to be concentrated among
the poor. This suggests that in practice VAT will likely be associated with less efficiency losses
and also be less regressive if evasion possibilities are taken into account.
Turning to the sides of producers and retailers, we provide tentative evidence that retailers
started to source more of their supplies from firms that were operating under VAT and less
from small farmers. This suggests that VAT enforcement can be thought of as a case of
industrial policy where enforcement of taxes has trickle down effects incentivizing suppliers to
formalize and become larger. Regarding retailers, we show that, similar to previous findings
from various settings, enforcement of taxes can hardly be perfect since it induces retailers to
try and move to other less verifiable margins of non-compliance with various state regulations.
These results on supply-chain effects and second-order evasion responses explain the low rate
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of a one-third passthrough estimate relative to what standard theory and empirics of tax
incidence suggest. This discrepancy suggests that even partial equilibrium incidence analysis
needs to take into account evasion opportunities.
43
References
Agrawal, D. and W. Hoyt (2019). Tax incidence in a multi-product world: Theoretical foun-
dations and empirical implications. Available at SSRN 3173180 .
Allingham, M. G. and A. Sandmo (1972). Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal
of Public Economics 1, 323–338.
Alm, J. and E. B. Sennoga (2010). Mobility, competition, and the distributional effects of tax
evasion. National Tax Journal 63(4), 1055–1084.
Alstadsæter, A., N. Johannesen, and G. Zucman (2019). Tax evasion and inequality. American
Economic Review 109(6), 2073–2103.
Ameria Management Advisory (2016). Retail sector in Armenia: Fast moving consumer goods
market. In Amberd Series. Yerevan, Armenia.
Andreyeva, T., M. W. Long, and K. D. Brownell (2010). The impact of food prices on
consumption: a systematic review of research on the price elasticity of demand for food.
American journal of public health 100(2), 216–222.
Antoniades, A., S. Clerides, and M. Xu (2019). Micro-responses to shocks: Pricing, promotion,
and entry. Technical report.
Ardalan, A. and S. G. Kessing (2019). Tax pass-through in the european beer market. Em-
pirical Economics, 1–22.
Artavanis, N. T. (2018). Tax evasion and vat rates: Evidence from a setting with limited
tax-shifting. Available at SSRN 2585147 .
Asatryan, Z. and A. Peichl (2017). Responses of firms to tax, administrative and accounting
rules: Evidence from Armenia. Technical report, ZEW Working Paper.
44
Atkin, D., B. Faber, T. Fally, and M. Gonzalez-Navarro (2020). A new engel on price index
and welfare estimation. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper No. 26890.
Atkin, D., B. Faber, and M. Gonzalez-Navarro (2018). Retail globalization and household
welfare: Evidence from mexico. Journal of Political Economy 126(1), 1–73.
Bachas, P., L. Gadenne, and A. Jensen (2019). Informality, consumption taxes and redistri-
bution.
Bajo-Buenestado, R. and M. A. Borrella-Mas (2019). Passing-through taxes beyond borders
with a cobra effect. Journal of Public Economics 177, 1–17.
Baker, P. and V. Brechling (1992). The impact of excise duty changes on retail prices in the
uk. Fiscal Studies 13(2), 48–65.
Baker, S. R., S. Johnson, and L. Kueng (2018). Shopping for lower sales tax rates. Technical
report, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 23665.
Banks, J., R. Blundell, and A. Lewbel (1997). Quadratic engel curves and consumer demand.
Review of Economics and statistics 79(4), 527–539.
Barnett, P. G., T. E. Keeler, and T.-w. Hu (1995). Oligopoly structure and the incidence of
cigarette excise taxes. Journal of Public Economics 57(3), 457–470.
Benedek, D., R. A. D. Mooij, M. Keen, and P. Wingender (2016). Estimating vat pass
through. Technical report, IMF Working Paper 15-214.
Benzarti, Y. and D. Carloni (2019). Who really benefits from consumption tax cuts? evidence
from a large vat cut in france. AEJ: Economic Policy 11(1), 38–63.
Benzarti, Y., D. Carloni, J. Harju, and T. Kosonen (2019). What goes up may not come
down: asymmetric incidence of value-added taxes. Technical report, National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No. 23849.
45
Benzarti, Y. and A. Tazhitdinova (2019). Do value-added taxes affect international trade
flows? evidence from 30 years of tax reforms. Technical report, NBER Working Paper No.
26195.
Berger, M., R. S. Gerlinde Fellner-Rohling, and C. Traxler (2016). Higher taxes, more evasion?
evidence from border differentials in tv license fees. Journal of Public Economics 135, 74–86.
Bergman, U. M. and N. L. Hansen (2016). Excise tax pass-through and menu costs: The
Danish evidence. Technical report, Danmarks Nationalbank Working Paper.
Besley, T. J. and H. S. Rosen (1999). Sales taxes and prices: An empirical analysis. National
Tax Journal 52(2), 157–178.
Bibler, A., K. Teltser, and M. Tremblay (2018). Inferring tax compliance from pass-through:
Evidence from airbnb tax enforcement agreements. Technical report, London School of
EconomicsWorking Paper.
Bird, R. and P.-P. Gendron (2007). The VAT in developing and transitional countries. Cam-
bridge University Press.
Bishop, J. A., J. P. Formby, and P. Lambert (2000). Redistribution through the income
tax: The vertical and horizontal effects of noncompliance and tax evasion. Public Finance
Review 28(4), 335–350.
Bonnet, C. and V. Requillart (2013). Tax incidence with strategic firms in the soft drink
market. Journal of Public Economics 106, 77–88.
Bozio, A., T. Breda, and J. Grenet (2018). Tax-benefit linkage and incidence of social security
contributions: Evidence from France. Technical report, Working Paper.
Buettner, T. and B. Madzharova (2019). Sales and price effects of pre-announced consumption
tax reforms: Micro-level evidence from European VAT. Technical report, CESifo Working
Paper No. 7626.
46
Carbonnier, C. (2007). Who pays sales taxes? evidence from French vat reforms, 1987-1999.
Journal of Public Economics 91, 1219–1229.
Carbonnier, C. (2013). Pass-through of per unit and ad valorem consumption taxes: Evidence
from alcoholic beverages in France. The BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 13(2),
837–863.
Carrillo, P., D. Pomeranz, and M. Singhal (2017). Dodging the taxman: Firm misreporting
and limits to tax enforcement. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 9(2),
144–164.
Cashin, D. and T. Unayama (2016). Measuring intertemporal substitution in consumption:
Evidence from a vat increase in japan. Review of Economics and Statistics 98(2), 285–297.
Cawley, J. and D. Frisvold (2017). The incidence of taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages: the
case of Berkeley, California. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 36(2), 303–326.
Chetty, R., A. Looney, and K. Kroft (2009). Salience and taxation: Theory and evidence.
American economic review 99(4), 1145–77.
Chouinard, H. and J. M. Perloff (2004). Incidence of federal and state gasoline taxes. Eco-
nomics Letters 83, 55–60.
Cnossen, S. (2018). Vat and agriculture: lessons from Europe. International Tax and Public
Finance 25(2), 519–551.
Conlon, C. T. and N. Rao (2019). Discrete prices and the incidence and efficiency of excise
taxes.
Cravino, J. and A. A. Levchenko (2017). The distributional consequences of large devaluations.
American Economic Review 107(11), 3477–3509.
De Loecker, J., P. K. Goldberg, A. K. Khandelwal, and N. Pavcnik (2016). Prices, markups,
and trade reform. Econometrica 84(2), 445–510.
47
De Paula, A. and J. A. Scheinkman (2010). Value-added taxes, chain effects, and informality.
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2(4), 195–221.
Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer (1980). An almost ideal demand system. The American
economic review 70(3), 312–326.
DeCicca, P., D. Kenkel, and F. Liu (2013). Who pays cigarette taxes? the impact of consumer
price search. Review of Economics and Statistics 95(2), 516–529.
Delipalla, S. and O. O’Donnell (2001). Estimating tax incidence, market power and market
conduct: The european cigarette industry. International Journal of Industrial Organiza-
tion 19(6), 885–908.
Doerr, A. and S. Necker (2018). Toward an understanding of collaborative tax evasion: A
natural field experiment with businesses. Technical report, Freiburger Diskussionspapiere
zur Ordnungso¨konomik No 18-13.
Doerrenberg, P. and D. Duncan (2019). Tax incidence in the presence of tax evasion.
Dornbusch, R. (1987). Exchange rates and prices. The American Economic Review , 93–106.
Doyle, J. J. and K. Samphantharak (2008). $2.00 gas! studying the effects of a gas tax
moratorium. Journal of Public Economics 92(3-4), 869–884.
Dyreng, S. D., M. Jacob, X. Jiang, and M. A. Mueller (2019). Tax incidence and tax avoidance.
Technical report, Working Paper.
Faber, B. and T. Fally (2020). Firm heterogeneity in consumption baskets: Evidence from
home and store scanner data. National Bureau of Economic Research 23101 .
Finkelstein, A. (2009). E-ztax: Tax salience and tax rates. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 124(3), 969–1010.
Fisman, R., Y. Hamao, and Y. Wang (2014). Nationalism and economic exchange: Evidence
from shocks to sino-japanese relations. The Review of Financial Studies 27(9), 2626–2660.
48
Fuest, C., A. Peichl, and S. Siegloch (2018). Do higher corporate taxes reduce wages? micro
evidence from germany. American Economic Review 108(2), 393–418.
Fullerton, D. and G. E. Metcalf (2002). Tax incidence. In Handbook of public economics,
Volume 4, pp. 1787–1872.
Gaarder, I. (2018). Incidence and distributional effects of value added taxes. The Economic
Journal 129(618), 853–876.
Gadenne, L., T. K. Nandi, and R. Rathelot (2018). Taxation and supplier networks: Evidence
from india. Technical report, University of Warwick Working Paper No 428.
Ganapati, S., J. S. Shapiro, and R. Walker (2020). Energy cost pass-through in US manufac-
turing: Estimates and implications for carbon taxes. American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics 12(2), 303–342.
Gerard, F., J. Naritomi, and A. Seibold (2018). Tax systems and inter-firm trade: Evidence
from the vat in brazil. Technical report, London School of Economics.
Gordon, J. P. (1989). Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion.
European economic review 33(4), 797–805.
Harasztosi, P. and A. Lindner (2019). Who pays for the minimum wage? American Economic
Review 109(8), 2693–2727.
Harding, M., E. Leibtag, and M. F. Lovenheim (2012). The heterogeneous geographic and
socioeconomic incidence of cigarette taxes: Evidence from nielsen homescan data. American
Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4(4), 169–198.
Harju, Jarkko, T. K. and O. N. Skans (2018). Firm types, price-setting strategies, and
consumption-tax incidence. Journal of Public Economics 165, 48–72.
Hastings, J. and E. Washington (2010). The first of the month effect: Consumer behavior
and store responses. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2, 142–162.
49
Hindriks, J. and V. Serse (2019). Heterogeneity in the tax pass-through to spirit retail prices:
Evidence from belgium. Journal of Public Economics 176, 142–160.
Hotelling, H. (1932). Edgeworth’s taxation paradox and the nature of demand and supply
functions. Journal of Political Economy 40(5), 577–616.
Jenkins, G. P., H. P. Jenkins, and C. Y. Kuo (2006). Is the value added tax naturally
progressive? Available at SSRN 897677 .
Johns, A. and J. Slemrod (2010). The distribution of income tax noncompliance. National
Tax Journal 63(3), 397.
Keen, M. and S. Smith (2006). Vat fraud and evasion: What do we know and what can be
done? National Tax Journal , 861–887.
Kenkel, D. S. (2005). Are alcohol tax hikes fully passed through to prices? evidence from
Alaska. The American economic review 95(2), 273–277.
Khan, M. S., P. N. Thompson, and V. J. Tremblay (2019). Marijuana tax incidence, stock-
piling, and cross-border substitution. International Tax and Public Finance, 1–25.
Kirwan, B. E. (2009). The incidence of US agricultural subsidies on farmland rental rates.
Journal of Political Economy 117(1), 138–164.
Kopczuk, W., J. Marion, E. Muehlegger, and J. Slemrod (2016). Does tax-collection invariance
hold? evasion and the pass-through of state diesel taxes. American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy 8(2), 251–86.
Kosonen, T. (2015). More and cheaper haircuts after vat cut? on the efficiency and incidence
of service sector consumption taxes. Journal of Public Economics 131, 87–100.
Kotlikoff, L. J. and L. H. Summers (1987). Tax incidence. In Handbook of public economics,
Volume 2, pp. 1043–1092. Elsevier.
50
Koujianou Goldberg, P. and R. Hellerstein (2012). A structural approach to identifying the
sources of local currency price stability. Review of Economic Studies 80(1), 175–210.
Kubik, J. D. (2004). The incidence of personal income taxation: Evidence from the tax reform
act of 1986. Journal of Public Economics 88(7-8), 1567–1588.
Mariscal, R. and A. M. Werner (2018). The price and welfare effects of the value-added tax:
Evidence from Mexico. International Monetary Fund WP-18-240 .
Melkumyan, M. (2014). Competition and regulation. In Amberd Series, Volume 2, pp. 1–90.
Tntesaget.
Michaels, G. and X. Zhi (2010). Freedom fries. American Economic Journal: Applied Eco-
nomics 2(3), 256–81.
Mun˜oz, M. S. and S. S.-W. Cho (2003). Social impact of a tax reform: The case of ethiopia.
International Monetary Fund WP-03-232 .
Nakamura, E. and D. Zerom (2010). Accounting for incomplete pass-through. The Review
of Economic Studies 77(3), 1192–1230.
Naritomi, J. (2019). Consumers as tax auditors,. American Economic Review 109(9), 3031–
3072.
Nyg˚ard, O. E., J. Slemrod, and T. O. Thoresen (2019). Distributional implications of joint
tax evasion. The Economic Journal 129(620), 1894–1923.
Pandya, S. S. and R. Venkatesan (2016). French roast: consumer response to interna-
tional conflict – evidence from supermarket scanner data. Review of Economics and Statis-
tics 98(1), 42–56.
Pissarides, C. A. and G. Weber (1989). An expenditure-based estimate of britain’s black
economy. Journal of public economics 39(1), 17–32.
51
Pless, J. and A. A. van Benthem (2019). Pass-through as a test for market power: An
application to solar subsidies. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 11(4),
367–401.
Pomeranz, D. (2015). No taxation without information: Deterrence and self-enforcement in
the value added tax. American Economic Review 105(8), 2539–2569.
Poterba, J. M. (1996). Retail price reactions to changes in state and local sales taxes. National
Tax Journal 49(2), 165–176.
Rees-Jones, A. and K. T. Rozema (2019). Price isn’t everything: Behavioral response around
changes in sin taxes. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper 25958.
Rothstein, J. (2010). Is the eitc as good as an nit? conditional cash transfers and tax
incidence. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy .
Ruf, M. and J. Schmider (2015). Who bears the cost of taxing the rich? an empirical study
on ceo pay wp15/27.
Saez, E., M. Matsaganis, and P. Tsakloglou (2012). Earnings determination and taxes:
evidence from a cohort-based payroll tax reform in greece. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 127(1), 493–533.
Slemrod, J. (2008). Does it matter who writes the check to the government? the economics
of tax remittance. National Tax Journal , 251–275.
Slemrod, J. (2019). Tax compliance and enforcement. Journal of Economic Literature 57(4),
904–954.
Slemrod, J., B. Collins, J. L. Hoopes, D. Reck, and M. Sebastian (2017). Does credit-card
information reporting improve small-business tax compliance? Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 149, 1–19.
52
Slemrod, J. and S. Yitzhaki (2002). Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration. In Handbook
of public economics, Volume 3, pp. 1423–1470. Elsevier.
Stehr, M. (2007). The effect of sunday sales bans and excise taxes on drinking and cross-border
shopping for alcoholic beverages. National Tax Journal , 85–105.
Stolper, S. (2016). Who bears the burden of energy taxes? the critical role of pass-through.
manuscript, Harvard Kennedy School .
Taubinsky, D. and A. Rees-Jones (2018). Attention variation and welfare: theory and evidence
from a tax salience experiment. Review of Economic Studies 88, 2462–2496.
Waseem, M. (2019). Overclaimed refunds, undeclared sales, and invoice mills: Nature and
extent of noncompliance in a value-added tax. Technical report, Mimeo.
Waseem, M. (2020). The role of withholding in the self-enforcement of a value-added tax:
Evidence from Pakistan. Technical report, Mimeo.
Weyl, E. G. and M. Fabinger (2013). Pass-through as an economic tool: Principles of incidence
under imperfect competition. Journal of Political Economy 121(3), 528–583.
Wilking, E. (2016). Hotel tax incidence with heterogeneous firm evasion: Evidence from
airbnb remittance agreements. Technical report, London School of Economics Working
Paper.
Yitzhaki, S. (1977). A note on income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Public
Economics 3, 201–202.
Young, D. J. and A. Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002). Alcohol taxes and beverage prices. National
Tax Journal 55(1), 57–73.
53
Appendix
Table A1: Passthrough Estimates
without spillovers with spillovers
+ - + -
α0 0.176*** 0.200***
(0.026) (0.019)
α+1 0.025 0.033
(0.036) (0.036)
α+2/−2 0.057*** 0.009 0.055*** 0.014
(0.013) (0.009) (0.015) (0.011)
α+3/−3 0.051*** 0.024*** 0.067*** 0.028***
(0.017) (0.007) (0.019) (0.009)
α+4/−4 0.038 0.011 0.053* 0.017*
(0.026) (0.008) (0.030) (0.010)
α+5/−5 0.059*** 0.027 0.083*** 0.029**
(0.021) (0.010) (0.023) (0.012)
α+6/−6 0.056*** 0.013 0.080*** 0.008
(0.017) (0.008) (0.018) (0.010)
α+7/−7 0.056*** 0.021** 0.067*** 0.020**
(0.016) (0.010) (0.015) (0.009)
Adj. R-squared 0.750 0.751
N 12682 12682
Notes: OLS regressions of equations 1 which does not con-
trol for spillover effects and 2 which controls for spillover
effects. Estimated coefficients of the interaction between af-
fected goods and affected stores for periods after the policy
change are displayed in columns with “+” sign and periods
before the policy change are displayed in columns with “-”
sign. All specifications include good-by-time, good-by-store
and store-by-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at time and store level. * (**) (***) indicates significance
at the 10 (5) (1) percent level.
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Table A2: Summary of Literature on Consumption Tax Incidence
Paper Type of tax Direction Goods/Services Country Year Passthrough
Benedek et al. (2016) VAT Both 67 Consumption Goods 17 Eurozone Countries 1999 - 2013 139%
VAT (reduced rate) Both 67 Consumption Goods 17 Eurozone Countries 1999 - 2013 30%
VAT (reclassification) Both 67 Consumption Goods 17 Eurozone Countries 1999 - 2013 8%
Carbonnier (2007) VAT Decrease Cars France 1987 57%
VAT Decrease Housing Repair Services France 1999 77%
Kosonen (2015) VAT Decrease Hairdressing Finland 2007 - 2011 50%
Besley and Rosen (1999) Sales Tax Increase Groceries United States 1982 - 1990 121%
Poterba (1996) Sales Tax Increase Clothing United States 1925 - 1939 62%
Sales Tax Increase Female clothing United States 1947 - 1977 133%
Sales Tax Increase Male clothing United States 1947 - 1977 84%
Sales Tax Increase Personal care items United States 1947 - 1977 117%
Chouinard and Perloff (2004) Excise Federal Tax Increase Gasoline United States 1993 47%
Excise State Tax Increase Gasoline United States 1993 101%
Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) Sales Tax Decrease Gasoline Unites States 2000 68%
Sales Tax Increase Gasoline Unites States (Illinois) 2000 82%
Sales Tax Increase Gasoline Unites States (Indiana) 2000 100%
Stolper (2016) Excise State Tax Increase Gasoline Spain 2007 - 2013 95%
Bergman and Hansen (2016) Excise Both Beer Denmark 1997 - 2005 384%
Excise Both Spirits Denmark 1997 - 2005 72%
Carbonnier (2013) Excise Increase Beer France 1997 275%
VAT Increase Beer France 1995 66%
Excise Increase Anise aperitif France 1997 244%
VAT Increase Anise aperitif France 1995 43%
Excise Increase Whisky France 1997 183%
VAT Increase Whisky France 1995 43%
Ardalan and Kessing (2019) Excise Both Beer European Union 1996 - 2016 93%
VAT Both Beer European Union 1996 - 2016 70%
Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002) Excise Increase Beer United States 1982 - 1997 171%
Excise Increase Wine United States 1982 - 1997 124%
Excise Increase Liquor United States 1982 - 1997 164%
Kenkel (2005) Excise Increase On-premise beer United States (Alaska) 2002 225%
Excise Increase Off-premise beer United States (Alaska) 2002 167%
Excise Increase On-premise Wine United States (Alaska) 2002 373%
Excise Increase On-premise Liquor United States (Alaska) 2002 328%
Excise Increase Off-premise Liquor United States (Alaska) 2002 189%
Harding et al. (2012) Excise Increase Cigarettes United States 2008 85%
Barnett et al. (1995) Excise State Tax Increase Cigarettes Unites States 1955 - 1990 89,70%
Excise Federal Tax Increase Cigarettes Unites States 1955 - 1990 101,60%
Delipalla and O’Donnell (2001) Ad valorem Increase Cigarettes 6 Northern European Countries 1982 - 1997 72%
Specific Tax Increase Cigarettes 6 Northern European Countries 1982 - 1997 92%
Ad valorem Increase Cigarettes 6 Southern European Countries 1982 - 1997 147,72%
Specific Tax Increase Cigarettes 6 Southern European Countries 1982 - 1997 216,54%
Bonnet and Requillart (2013) Excise Increase Soft Drinks France 2005 120%
VAT (uniform) Increase Soft Drinks France 2005 75%
Sales Tax Increase Soft Drinks France 2005 74%
Cawley and Frisvold (2017) Excise Increase Soft Drinks United States (Berkeley, CA) 2014 43,10%
Benzarti and Carloni (2019) VAT Decrease Sit-down restaurants France 2004 - 2012 9,70%
Benzarti et al. (2019) VAT Increase Hairdressing Finland 2012 34%
VAT Decrease Hairdressing Finland 2007 7%
Harju and Skans (2018) VAT Decrease Restaurant Meals Finland 2010 63,10%
VAT Decrease Restaurant Meals Sweden 2012 27,30%
VAT Decrease Restaurant Meals Finland 2010 40,40%
Buettner and Madzharova (2019) VAT Both Many products European Union 2004 - 2013 95,60%
Gaarder (2018) VAT Decrease Food (Fresh) Norway 2001 10,90%
VAT Decrease Food (Storable) Norway 2001 9,80%
Hindriks and Serse (2019) Excise Increase Vodka Belgium 2015 - 2016 116%
Excise Increase Whisky Belgium 2015 - 2016 99%
Excise Increase Rum Belgium 2015 - 2016 109%
Khan, Thompson, and Tremblay (2019) Sales Tax Increase Marijuana United States (Oregon) 2016 92%
Baker and Brechling (1992) Excise Both Beer United Kingdom 1973 - 1989 102%
Excise Both Wine United Kingdom 1975 - 1989 164%
Excise Both Spirits United Kingdom 1973 - 1989 91%
Excise Both Tobacco United Kingdom 1973 - 1989 71%
Excise Both Petrol United Kingdom 1973 - 1989 91%
Stehr (2007) State beer tax Both Beer United States 1990 - 2004 94%
State liquor tax Both Spirits United States 1990 - 2004 156%
Markup on spirits Both Spirits United States 1990 - 2004 19%
Source: Based on own compilation. We thank the research assistance of Alexander Nawrath for help in
compiling this literature.
Notes: Passthrough estimates represent the baseline result(s) of each paper according to our judgement.
Figure A1: Histogram of Estimates of Consumption Tax Incidence from Existing Literature
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Notes: The histogram plots 67 baseline estimates of consumption tax inci-
dence on consumer prices collected from from 27 papers. For further details
on the sample of these papers and the underlying meta-data, see Table A2.
The vertical line denotes the baseline incidence estimate of this paper ob-
tained from Table 4.
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Figure A2: Justifying Price Increases
Notes: Photo from Yerevan City supermarket taken in early June 2018. The
Armenian text reads: “Dear customers, from now on our stores will pay a
20% VAT on meat and vegetables”.
Source: panarmenian.net
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